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## Editorial

### **Ioan-Gheorghe Rotaru**

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Knowledge-based human society is a new stage in the development of our human civilization, a stage that is in a new development, from a qualitative point of view, of the way of life, a state of affairs that involves the widespread use of information and knowledge in all spheres of the social activities palette. For the human society of knowledge, an unquestionable value is scientific knowledge and its fruits or its product, or scientific knowledge. Thus, for the development of human society, based on scientific knowledge acts, both scientific knowledge itself and culture, from the perspective of the scientific context, are the most important issues to be included in the general knowledge of society (Țurcan 2011, 35).

Scientific communication is nothing more than the exchange of information, ideas and discoveries among scientists, which Leo Meltzer also defines as the totality of means, publications, institutional activities and any other channels of information transmission, as well as habits that, either directly or indirectly, affects

the transmission of scientific messages between scientists (Kaplan 1968, 112). Leo Meltzer states that this way of communication is different from ordinary, everyday communication, communication about physical reality that only refers to generalized and encoded knowledge. Each communication, ideally, contributes through the information palette brought to the formation of the knowledge patrimony, unanimously accepted and identified as specific aspects of science, which is achieved in particular by expanding the research limits and if necessary by modifying the hypotheses outlined above, along with additional explanations or verification of existing and accepted knowledge in the scientific world (Türcan 2011, 37).

Scientific communication can take two forms, namely communication between scientists, or simply informational communication, the communication of research results, in various communication possibilities provided by the informational means of the international information flow. As scientists exchange information among themselves, it gives a social dimension to the process of knowledge, while only informational communication, of the research results, gives a dimension of content about knowledge. When both dimensions, namely the social dimension (communication between scientists) and the informational dimension of content, are met, we are dealing with an internal scientific communication, while only the communication of the research results, based on the informational communication through various channels for information media is an external scientific communication (Watzlawick 1967, 296; Türcan 2011, 37).

According to Bryant Chris's (2003, 357-361) vision, scientific communication is nothing but a summary of all the ways and processes by which scientific knowledge alongside cultural values is absorbed and incorporated into the great cultural palette of society and thus both knowledge and scientific culture become part of general human knowledge.



Our modern world, according to Nelly Turcan (2010, 26) is nothing but „the direct or indirect product of science, and the speed of progress in science has always been strongly dependent on how scientists can communicate effectively to colleagues about research results and identify individuals who want to implement these results in new technologies and practices. Modern science has crystallized at the intersection of practical, social and cultural experiences of great complexity ... Science is a complex social phenomenon that depends on several other phenomena of social life ... As a social system, science can exist only in the interaction and linkage between the constituent elements: human resources, embedded in scientific research; ideas, facts, theories and methods of research; scientific literature; instrumentation for scientific research. Whilst knowledge is generally linked to an individual, scientific research, the purpose of which is to obtain, accumulate and interpret scientific information, is a collective activity; it is related to the communicative interaction between researchers. Only when knowledge is transmitted and accessible to the scientific community for validation and uses in later research, this knowledge becomes scientific and provides knowledge.”

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# **Ethno-cultural Pluralism in European Cities and Policy of Multiculturalism: Global and Local Aspects**

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**ABSTRACT:** With the increasing urbanization and migration processes in European cities, ethno-political processes have intensified, and cities have become the central place of localization of intercultural contacts. European cities are the objects of multiculturalism policy, developing and supporting ethno-cultural diversity and tolerance. Cities reflect simultaneous trends of globalization and localization. Because of deepening of the processes of globalization, the role of local areas and cultures increases. The modern European metropolis is looking for ways to coordinate the cultures and values of different civilizations. Cities perform a cultural function, enabling cultures to survive. At the local level, cities create mechanisms for involving ethnic communities in social life, and the interests of communities are observed. European political institutions create action programs for the implementation of these mechanisms. The policy of multiculturalism in the metropolis is the search for ways of coordinating the cultures and values of various civilizations.

KEY WORDS: Globalization, localization, European city, multiculturalism, municipal policy, ethnic differences

In today's world, due to the rapid growth of cities and urban population, urban studies are becoming more and more relevant. At the beginning of the XX century, only 10 percent of the world population lived in cities. By the end of the century already 47 percent Earthlings have become city dwellers. Currently, more than half the world's population is concentrated in urban areas - about 3.5 billion out of the current 7. It is expected that by 2030, the proportion of urban population will reach 60 per cents (UN, DESA 2007).

In Europe, the urbanization rate now stands at 74.6 percent (UNEP, GEO 3). In 2004, according to the European statistics agency, population growth in the 25 EU countries amounted to 2.3 million people, including 1.9 million falls on the influx of immigrants. Expanding more and more due to the influx of migrants, cities of our time turn into megacities, complex in structure, both in urban management and planning, and in the ethnic and socio-cultural structure. This concentration of population in urban areas always involves cultural streams that become the main engine of economic and social change.

Cities characterized by the process of ethno-cultural pluralization are "global cities". The hypothesis of the "global city" has been formulated by S.Sassen. Known for her studies of the processes of globalization, international migration and urban studies, Sassen has formulated the idea on the basis of studies in three cities: New York, London and Tokyo. She argues that the modern development of the world economy has led to the emergence of a new strategic role of large cities. Most of them had previously been centers of international trade, but now in their activities got new features:

large cities have become «command posts» - centers that produce political solutions to the global economy (Sassen 2005).

An important criterion for the typology of global cities, along with economic development, the presence of the head offices of global corporations, major transportation hubs, there is a factor —attractiveness to migrants. The migration has been identified as an important factor in the formulation of the hypothesis of global cities by J. Friedman (1986), who argued that cities are attractive for migrants both inside the country and for international migrants.

It is safe to say that all global cities are the destinations of migrants, and for this reason are areas of intense ethnic and social polarization. Absorbing the traditions and lifestyles of people coming, cities become centers of concentration of cultures and places of preservation of cultural heritage of many nations. Absorbing the traditions and lifestyles of people coming, cities become centers of concentration of cultures and places of preservation of cultural heritage of many nations.

Global processes have intensified differentiation of the population, which contributed to the formation of polymorphic urban cultures. Such cultures can enrich and strengthen the city, but also can serve as a source of contention and the basis of social exclusion. Another important impact of globalization on the urban processes is standardization. Cities where culture, infrastructure and organization is concentrated, have long been the engine of progress and civilization centers of opportunity and prosperity. In developed and developing countries, cities offer unique opportunities for its people to raise revenue mobilization of political action and the provision of greater access to education, employment and social services (Khondker 2004).

Thus, we can speak of a certain contradiction, because on the one hand, modern cities are the centers of economic development,

focusing innovation in all spheres of life, cultural centers, but on the other hand, they are centers of social tension and segregation, the centers of economic and social problems, unemployment. Cities are subject to terrorist attacks which dehumanize urban socio-cultural space. Modern cities hold the most important socio-cultural function, proving to place the guardianship of the cultural heritage of nations and peoples living in them. The most important processes in society are manifested at all levels of social and cultural space of cities. Social macrostructure is a system of social relations between demographic, ethnic and cultural communities.

While the world economic processes have long been of a global nature, the city is trying to find its niche under the new conditions the distribution of labor, production and consumption. The problem of simultaneous globalization of «the local» and the localization of the «global» can be described as a double process of macro-localization and micro-globalization.

In tracing the shift in the understanding of the political, economic and social systems of the “global” to the “local” urban studies are an alternative analysis of the geographical scale, particularly when the nation-state loses its relevance in an increasingly integrates the global space. Global social and economic changes erode traditional identification of people with residence at the same time weakening the role of the nation-state as a source of identification.

In 1970-ies when some states faced with the need to review immigration policies and searched for a new model of interaction with ethnic minorities, the idea of multiculturalism was born. Multiculturalism - concept that refers to the fact of cultural diversity, due to ethnic, linguistic and religious heterogeneity of the population; the practice of social and political organization in a multicultural environment; ideology aimed at the promotion of cultural diversity. Multiculturalism includes several aspects: philosophical, political, legal and practical-political.

The role of cities - the implementation of the policy of multiculturalism is in practical-political aspect, since it is at the level of local government multiculturalism policies are implemented in practice. At the state level there is political - legal process, identifies the main priorities for immigration and cultural policy, to create a legal base.

The social space of multicultural cities is arranged in a difficult way. The internal structure of the city begins to form different levels: regions, communities, neighborhoods. Communities in the cities, which are bringing people together on the basis of shared beliefs and lifestyle, influence the behavior of citizens in the socio-cultural space of the city. There is a dialogue, bringing together representatives of various subcultures, ethnic groups, media differing lifestyles and realized in the discussions in the parliament, schools, churches and other city institutions, and at the household level, families.

The choice of settlement areas and the development of its urban space depend on the residents belonging to a particular ethnic and cultural layer of urban residents. Local changes in the distribution of the urban population affect the intra-communication, unemployment and labor relations, as well as on the development of private property. In general, European city authorities are looking for the appropriate model for themselves the construction of harmonious relations in multi-ethnic societies in the framework of the urban space. Scientists point out two main types of official policy to combat urban social segregation.

City multiculturalism—is a kind of compromise between the city, representing the culture of the majority and the minority—a population of visitors. Thus, we can talk about the integration “from the top» and integration «from below». In urban areas there are all types of integration. On the one hand, immigrants must adapt to the language and traditions of existing urban community. On the other hand, the authorities should help migrants to adapt to new

cultural and social space, creating the necessary conditions for self-identification of citizens.

So, summing up, we note that the multicultural policy in European cities is developing as the implementation processes of globalization and localization at the same time and in a dialectical unity. Modern migration processes have increased due to the growth of megacities influenced by economic trends. Global trends have increased population diversification and intensified cross-cultural interaction (Rex and Singh 2003). In this process, cities are the regulators of multicultural relations, political and cultural "integrators". City multiculturalism - is a compromise between city authorities, representing the culture of the majority population and immigrants.

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## Family – Core in Educating and Forming the Young Generation

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**ABSTRACT:** In any society, the family has been distinguished as a specific group, which can be characterized as a strong internal weld, maintained due to internal forces. The internal forces that unite the family are the strong feelings and emotional attachment of spouses, as well as the parents and children's, mutual respect and solidarity. To this sentimental cohesion, one will add a weave of addictions that result from economic, social and cultural functions, from duties towards children, towards parents (Voinea 2005, 11).

**KEY WORDS:** family, education, youth, social sciences, sentiment

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Through its universality, complexity and flexibility, the family continues to occupy a central place among the factors that determine and guide development, the continuity of human societies, by providing an affective, value-enhancing, orderly, securing and individualized climate (Voinea 2005, 8).

The most common definition of the family is that it „constitutes the fundamental unity of society and the natural environment for the growth and welfare of the child. Each society has a certain family

system to regulate relationships between mature men and women and between them and children. The family is a superior form of community - mainly of the husband, wife and children - based on social and biological relationships, with the supreme goal of preparing a future, healthy and well-educated generation to participate in the development of society” (Bulgaru and Dilion 2000, 103).

The family as a relatively closed group possesses a particular psychological social structure of interpersonal relationships. In their studying, there are functional links between individuals who fulfill certain roles, that is, they follow certain norms and patterns of behavior that belong to the culture they belong to. The core of intrafamilial relationships, as in any other social group, is the joint activity oriented towards family problems (Dumitrascu 1997).

If before the discovery of problems and „dysfunctions” that occurred within the family in its effort to adapt to modern society, the general view was that the family is the main source of human sociality and sociability, that the family model is - and still needs -, to be taken up in the organization of society as a whole (the old societies, as well as the current social organizations which still conform to a traditional model, preserve models of structures inspired by the family community), today the idea of anachronism of the family life, as a stand-alone institution. The idea of family autonomy over many of the social development programs, its ability to delay or even to oppose some of the provisions of these programs obviously tends to dislike the architects and manage social progress. (For example, the provisions that encourage the individual’s emancipation of structures that can affect their free personal assertion. This is particularly the case with ideologies aimed at empowering women or children and young people and attacking the basic structure and family authority). Nowadays, sociologists agree that the individual individuality of personality („individuality,” as defined by Georg Simmel) increases proportionally with the expansion

of the individual's social environment. Competition develops the specialization of individuals as they multiply, thus favoring their differentiation and separation (Bistriceanu 2006, 7).

Family history illustrates the evolution of this institution from a broad, comprehensive social group of all aspects of individual life, society itself, to the family as a small group, as a unity of a plan that embraces it (the expanded society). The tendency to diminish the area and social influence of the family left much room for „free” (here in the sense of no constraint) manifestation of the individual. Its transformation into unity seems today, rather than constituting an integrated building of individual personality, to be perceived as a stage towards its abolition as an autonomous, constraining structure (Bistriceanu 2006, 10).

French anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss defines the family as an organized group that originates in marriage and consists of husband, wife, and children born of their union, of their relationship, though sometimes to this restricted group and other relatives can be added. The family group is united by moral, legal, economic, religious and social rights and obligations.

The family group varies according to its structure levels. From this point of view, we distinguish the simple family and extended family. Simple family can also be defined as primary or elementary, and consists of parents and their unmarried children (own or adopted). Within the simple family, one can speak of the *family of origin* or *consanguine*, which represents the group in which the child is born, and *the procreation* or *own family* - which each adult matures when he marries.

American sociologist Thomas Burch argues that people living in the same dwelling, whether or not relatives, are considered members of the same family unity. In this case, family unity is dwelling and is known in the sociological literature as a resistance family.

Another aspect is that, when family members do not share the same house, but live at long distances and when their husband or wife is away in the country or abroad to do work, study, make certain specializations, and visit periodically each-other. In this case, we have an *interaction* or *migrant family*.

American sociologist N.J. Smelser looked at the broad-based family as a unit of continuity, meaning that there are many generations living in the same old house, continuing the traditions, concerns and habits of the family. In this case, individuals can disappear, they are passers-by, but the family as a group is maintained for generations.

Another point of view in connection with the concept of family is the sociological names of „*normal family*” and „*abnormal family*”. A first form of understanding the notion of „normal family” is that of a family that is composed of a husband, wife, and one or more children. By „abnormal family” in this respect is meant an incomplete family, namely without one of the spouses or without children. Another form of understanding of the term „normal family” is the family officially formed in front of state organs, and the „abnormal family” is the unofficial state organ, living in concubinage. If we refer to the ethical character of the family, then the „normal family” means the family based on respect for love, and in the case of the „abnormal family” it is about building a family based on interests. Another aspect of the term „normal family” is that which refers to a family that has a dignified, honored life, and in which children receive a particular education. The term „abnormal family” refers to disorganized families, with the presence of alcoholics, chronic ill people who do not work, hobble, and practice prostitution. In these families there are „problem children”, delinquent children and other social deficiencies (Bulgaru and Dilion 2000, 103-106).

Children are the ones who bear most of the unwanted consequences of the conflict between family members. The impact of the described

phenomenon on the modern family is manifested in the increase in the number of divorces, the number of incomplete families, the decrease in the birth rate. In the social situation created, the family is a good whose loss both individuals, men and women, and the whole society, pay him dearly.

Intra-familial relationships are harmonious as far as they respond to the humanist principle - forming an attitude towards the other, which in turn implies generosity, mutual respect and exigency. All these provide a favorable psychological social climate in the family without which the necessary conditions for the education of the children cannot be created (Dumitrascu 1997).

**Family as a prototype of society.** The family belongs to the category of primary or fundamental realities, being a universal human institution. Like the community or community of man, the family can be the nucleus of understanding and explaining reality (Rotaru 2011, 5).

## 1. Anthropological approach

Research data has led to the consolidation of a consistent, more consistent knowledge base than that provided by sociological studies. This may be a cause for which the anthropological definitions given to the family are a landmark in the sociological approach. The best known and most useful definitions of the family usually have two meanings:

- + the limited one, according to which **the family is a social group formed by a married couple and their children** (a definition based on marriage and couple, as an institution generating family life, a controversial conception, as we will see in the following chapters);
- + the broader one, which identifies the family with **the social group whose members are linked by age, marriage or**

**adoption, which live together, cooperate economically and take care of their children** (George Peter Murdock).

In line with the above-mentioned anthropologist's definition, the *Britannica Encyclopedia* describes the family by three main features: the common home of members, economic cooperation and biological reproduction.

## 2. Historical approach

Also in the Great Britain, a special field, called *family history*, was born. In the research of British specialists in family history (as an autonomous study discipline), the investigations of this institution focused on one of three aspects (Michael Anderson):

- a) *Affective dimension* (referring to marital or parental relationships, sexual attitudes, premarital practices, etc.); the research of this direction is that the major socio-cultural changes influence the affective family profile. We consider counterproductive the difficulty of detecting and relative quantification of specific indicators.
- b) *Demographic dimension* (households surveyed, number of baptisms, marriages, funerals, and research base as civilian registers). This approach is closer to the natural sciences, providing verifiable information with a high degree of precision.
- c) *Economic and household dimension* (refers to economic relations between family members, inheritance, ownership, succession of titles and privileges, etc.).

## 3. Sociological approach

The family is therefore the purest form of manifestation of human society, which gives the profile of the first forms of collective cohabitation. For a long time, the family has been the basis and model for building society.

Particularly more attentive to the paradigmatic context than to the subjective and objective consistency of the family, sociologists place their studies in the three major theoretical perspectives: functionalism, conflicting and interactionism.

According to the functionalist perspective, the family is a social institution which, like all other social institutions, exists by virtue of exercising certain functions. The general types of family functions identified are: reproduction (producing a sufficient number of offspring to ensure the perpetuation of the community or society concerned), socialization (transmission to children - but not exclusively to them - of dominant cultural models), care, protection and affection, identifying (conferring an identity and social status by legitimating belonging to a particular kinship group), and regulating sexual behavior.

*The conflicting perspective* conceives the family as a system of permanent conflicts, negotiations and trusts. Despite the coercion to co-operate to survive, spouses compete for autonomy, authority and privileges.

*The interactive perspective* (represented by Peter Berger, Sheldon Stryker, etc.) understands the family as a dynamic entity, in which people constantly shape their existence and define their resolutions. Marriage, even the birth of children, involves the shaping of new definitions; the process is all the more complicated as they have to build a sub-world, a kind of greenhouse in which husbands, two people with different and separate biographies can coexist and interact (Bistriceanu 2006, 11- 15).

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# God's Existence and the Possibility of Knowing Him

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**ABSTRACT:** The real knowledge of God is essential to human life. You cannot get to know God except when you value the work and the Word of God. The fact that some people promote so aggressively unbelief in the existence of God does not mean that He does not exist. It must be remembered that every man has the opportunity to know God. This knowledge of God and communion with Him depends on the choice of each individual. The Bible says that God exists from eternity to eternity (Ps 90: 2), in other words, God has neither beginning nor end. Even if we cannot fully understand certain things about God, that does not mean we cannot know God. This article highlights the reality of God's existence and the fact that man can know God in a personal way.

**KEY WORDS:** God, existence, knowledge, man, faith

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Human religious concerns testify about the desire to know God. The question that arises is the following: If God exists, can I know Him? Pascal spoke of God as a *Deus Absconditus* (a hidden God), but he also claimed that this hidden God revealed Himself and that is why he may be known. To know Him means having eternal life and to grow in His knowledge means having abundant blessings.

Although knowing God has in its content mysterious and unobserved truths, it is objective and sure because it comes from God, and it is possible to reach its understanding through faith and its use through living. However, Lossky (1973, 3) said: „There will always be an irrational residue that escapes analysis and cannot be expressed in concepts; is the unknown depth of things that constitute their true, ineffable essence”. Thus, when it comes to knowing God, epistemology is totally inadequate due to the radical lack of correspondence between the human mind and the reality it wishes to achieve. (The epistemological method allows a limited knowledge of some of the properties of objects that can be observed.)

The alternative proposed by Lossky for the knowledge of God is found in gnoseology. „Gnoseology is not the result of human effort, it is a divine gift received through a revealing encounter. In this revealing encounter, God affirms that he is at the same time immanent and transcendent, and in the dialectic of transcendence and immanence, God is cognizable and incognoscible at the same time” (Lossky 1978, 31). However, what can be known about God, information that man is then called upon to transmit further is not the result of rational efforts but the follow-up of God’s self-revelation. Regarding this, Charles C. Ryrie (1993, 25). said: „God’s knowledge can be characterized by its source, content, progression, and purpose”.

Knowing God fully is both objective and personal. Knowing truths about a person without knowing it personally is limited, just as a personal knowledge lacking the facts is incomplete. God revealed many truths about Himself, the truths needed to develop a personal relationship with Him. If this knowledge were limited to objective truths and would not have been supplemented by a personal relationship with Him, it would have no eternal consequences. As in a relationship between men, the relationship God-man cannot begin without the knowledge of minimal truths about the Divine

Person; the personal relationship, then generates the desire to know more truths about the Divine Person, which leads to a deepening of the relationship and so on (Ryrie 1993, 26).

Knowing God differs from any other knowledge in that man possesses it only to the extent that God discovers it. If God did not initiate this revelation of Himself, there would be no possibility for man to know Him. The human being must first subordinate to the God he wants to know, unlike other fields of knowledge where man usually places himself above the object under study (Ryrie 1993, 27).

In Romans 1:19, the apostle Paul emphasized that “what is known about God is revealed to them” and adds that this is because “God has been revealed to them”. However, there are also people about whom Scripture says they are without wisdom by denying the existence of God. (The madman says in his heart “There is no God”. Psalm 14: 1; 53: 1). This denial of God’s existence is but a consequence of sin.

Heraclit makes Logos the intelligible support of existence, being that “thing” that determines the course of all things (Guthrie 1999, 281-284). For Greek rationalism to know is to know with the cause. Even defining God means defining a cause beyond which there is no other cause (Eco 1996, 45). The essence of philosophy, at this stage, was to define the conditions of the intelligible, „to put the absolute in front of conscience and to establish it as a term in relation to our being, without thereby falling out of condition” (Vlăduțescu 1987, 15). A distinction is thus established between what is (being) and what it thinks (thinking). Knowledge is realized through *dynamism*, translated in the sense of *soul capacity, faculty or skill* (Mureșan 2000, 50-51).

Although God reveals himself as wisdom, love, and kindness, his nature remains unknown in its depths, which is why our concepts must always be formulated so that they are not blocked within

the limits of their narrow sense. (These intelligent attributes of God, characteristic of positive theology, are analyzed by Dionysius Pseudo-Areopagite in *The Divine Names*, in *The Complete Works*, p. 52).

As Lossky (1978, 33) notes:

Surely God is wise, but not in the banal sense of the merchant or philosopher. His unlimited wisdom is not an internal necessity of his nature. The name, the highest name, even love, expresses, but does not exhaust the divine essence. They represent the attributes through which the divinity communicates itself, without its secret source, its nature ever exhausting or being objectively subject to our detailed analysis. Our purified concepts allow us to come closer to God; the divine name allows us, in a sense, even to penetrate into Him. But we can never encompass His essence; it would mean that He is determined by its attributes; but He is not determined by anything and that is why he is personal.

The opportunity of knowing God is open to man, even necessary for his existence. Being the incarnate and revealed truth to the world, God is both a source of any possible knowledge and a guarantor and generator of knowing the truth.

It should be noted at the same time that knowing God is not the same as having God. As Gregory of Nyssa (1857-1912): „Human health is a great good for human life. But happiness lies not in knowing what health is, but in living healthy. [...] The Lord does not delight those who know God, but those who have God”.

Without knowing God there can be no self-knowledge. But the man never comes to a clear knowledge of himself if he has not first looked at the face of God and has not come down from his contemplation to self-seeking. From here it can be concluded that man is never touched and affected sufficiently by the knowledge of his humble state than when he compares himself with the majesty of God.

According to Patristic writings, there is a natural knowledge of God, which starts from creation to its Creator and a supernatural knowledge that proceeds from God to men. The two ways of knowing God are closely related, supporting and complementing each other.

For Barth (1957, 121), to know God means to enter into a relationship with Him in a salvific experience. Barth is skeptical about man's ability to know God beyond revelation in Christ. This would mean that man could know the existence, the being of God, without knowing anything about the grace and mercy of God. This would prejudice the unity of God because He would separate His being from the fullness of His work (1957, 93). If a man could acquire a certain knowledge of God besides his revelation that is in Jesus Christ, he would at least contribute little to his salvation, to his spiritual situation before God. In this case, the "faith only" principle would be compromised.

According to Barth (1937, 49), revelation is always and exclusively the revelation of God in Jesus Christ: the Word became flesh. The possibility of knowing God apart from the graceful revelation in Christ would thus eliminate the need for Christ. Knowing about God is so in order to know God. In this case, the information must lead to the relationship.

As to the personal knowledge of God, Jesus said in Mathew 11:27: „No one knows the Son altogether, except the Father; so no one knows the Father except the Son, and the one who the Son wants to reveal Him". This way of knowing God cannot be gained through human effort and wisdom, as the apostle Paul points out to the Corinthians (1Corinthians 1:21): „The world, with its wisdom, did not know it God is in the wisdom of God". Because God is infinite, and we are limited, we can never understand God fully, so one can say that man can know God, but he can never comprehend it in

an exhaustive way (Psalm 139:6,17; 145:3). This aspect also has a positive application, Wayne Grudem (2004, 177) said: „This means that we will never be able to know” too much “about God, because we will never exhaust the things that we can learn about Him, and we will never get tired in the joy of discovering more and more of the greatness and splendor of His works”.

„Self-existence or absolute independence as a supreme being means that God is not determined by anything outside in thought, will, power, wisdom” (Wenger 1954, 59). God’s existence does not, therefore, end. It is not interrupted or limited to the sequence of events. Brekhof (1978, 60) defines God’s eternal existence as: „That perfection by which God rises above all the temporal boundaries and sequence of events and exerts his existence in an indivisible present”.

„The endless existence of God means that He did not appear at any given moment, nor was He caused to appear, He is self-existent, without any limit” (Ryrie 1993, 37). An encouraging implication of God’s eternal existence is that God has not ceased and will never cease to exist, and therefore His providential control is assured for eternity.

Do not forget that divine revelation is not only about knowing God, but also about experiencing man in accordance with what God has made known to him. The knowledge of God thus, becomes a major element of human spirituality and perfection. Since man cannot understand God through his own efforts, God has revealed Himself through a „revelation dressed in human language and in the human categories of thought and action” (Ramm 1961, 36-37). Regarding this, Vladimir Lossky (1998, 104) said: „Rationally, schematically, we know God from knowing his attributes; more specifically He is revealed through His work in the world”. But without the existence of human beings, the created world would be meaningless.

Although man is a finite being, he has the opportunity to enter into communion with the infinite Being of God. If God had not revealed to man, there would have been no possibility for man to know God. Acquisition of knowledge involves complex cognitive processes: perception, communication, association and reasoning, while knowledge is also related to the awareness of human beings (Cavell 2002, 238–266).

Recognition of God's existence and personal knowledge of God is based on faith. God can be known by faith in the Word of Scripture. At the same time, believers can get to more and more know God by walking with Him. God's knowledge grows in the believer's life commensurately to his fellowship with God. Full knowledge will be when believers will see him face to face.

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## Morality to Immanuel Kant

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**ABSTRACT:** The number is the unity of the synthesis of the diverse of a homogeneous intuition, in that we produce the time in understanding intuition. Reality is the pure concept of intellect, a concept that in itself indicates an existing one. Time says Kant is nothing but the form of intuition, hence objects as phenomena, is the transcendental material of objects as things in themselves. **KEY WORDS:** phenomenon, reason, time, transcendental, concept, a priori

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Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), gnoseologist and epistemologist, discussed the ontological issue, because it imagined reality as a phenomenon and, on the other, as a thing in itself, noumenon, the existence of the intellect. The phenomenon is sensible reality as the object of sensitive intuition, and the thing itself is an absolutely supersensible, therefore incognoscible reality, which can be thought only by intellect, being an exclusive existence of the intellect. Cognoscible is only the phenomenon, the thing itself, which although real is incognostible. Knowledge is an active synthesis of

empirical data, a collaboration between sensitivity and intellect, the path going from the senses, through intellect to reason.

I. Kant asserts that the thesis of the unity of consciousness is that I think, which has to accompany all the representations. Kant defined experience as the clear representation of what belongs to a concept. This exposure is metaphysical, it contains what the needles represent the concept as a priori. That is why space is not a metaphysical concept to be taken out of external experiences. The representation of space can not be deduced from the experience of reporting the external phenomenon. Space is the necessary a priori representation that underlies all external intuitions.

Time is not a discursive concept or a universal concept, but a pure form of sensitive intuition, and the infinity of time is no other than any determined magnitude of time. What is relevant to I. Kant is that knowledge through senses, which corresponds to aesthetics, and intellect research is provided by analytics.

Instead, the reason is guided by dialectics (in the sense of abusive use of logic, a logic of misleading appearance). Transcendental analytics and transcendental dialectics are summed up in a transcendental logic, which, unlike formal logic, abstracts only the empirical elements of knowledge, not all its contents. In order to delimit pure empirical knowledge, transcendental aesthetics are based on a question (how are a priori judgments possible?) That then take particular drawings (how is pure mathematics possible?).

Unlike the analytical judgment (which is an explanatory judgment, whose preface only clarifies the subject, but does not enrich the knowledge), the synthetic judgment is an extensive one, in which the predicate is added to the subject, adding something to the content and thus enlarging the knowledge. This enrichment is proved by Kant in first in the level of transcendental aesthetics, of a priori sensitive knowledge through pure geometry and pure arithmetic.

The forms of pure a priori intuition are space and time, being functions of sensitivity, subjective conditions of all phenomena, which have a priori objectivity; they are not transcendent but derived from sensitivity, structure the sensible.

In the transcendental dialectic, if the object of the intellect is sensitivity, the object of reason is the knowledge of the intellect; synthesizing, the intellect unifies phenomena by rules, and reason reports these rules to its own principles. The reason is essentially a faculty of principles, judgment by principles, because these principles remain in a transcendent position to phenomena, to the real.

As categories are purely original concepts of intellect, pure rational concepts of reason become ideas. For Kant Idea remains a concept of thought, thought not known, and pure thinking complements knowledge without enriching it. In this sense, Kant delimits three pure Ideas of reason:

1. The idea of absolute unity of the thinking subject
2. The idea of absolute unity of the set of conditions
3. The idea of absolute unity of all the objects of thought in general: the soul, the world and God

Reason does not know, it only facilitates knowledge through intellect. and Kant came to answer the three famous questions, summarizing his entire philosophical interest:

1. What Can I Know?
2. What do I have to do?
3. What is allowed to hope?

Transcendental aesthetics is the science of all principles a priori (Rotaru 2005, 36-38) and sensitivity is the ability to receive representations, instead, the sensation is the effect of an object on the representative faculty, and the intuition that relates to the object with the help of sensation is empirical. The concept of intellect

encompasses pure synthetic judging, and time is a formal condition of inner sense.

In Kant's *Critique of Criminal Law*, Kant has designated the faculty of judging as a mean between intellect and reason because of its ability to place particular laws under the domination of higher, though empirical laws. This is the faculty of subsuming the individual under general, the faculty of thinking the particular as contained in general. subsuming can be determinative (when given that general and subsumes the particular) and reflective (when given the particular and have found general) ins Kant was interested only faculty of reflective judgment with its subdivisions :

1. the faculty of aesthetic judgment, that is, the faculty to judge the formal or subjective end in the sense of pleasure and inconvenience.
2. faculty of teleological judging, the faculty to judge the real, objective purpose of nature through intellect and reason.

Philosophy, as a principle of human reason, includes in the sense of Kantian philosophy only two premises: nature and freedom, the law of nature and the moral law, which is what it should be. Man as the ultimate goal, as self-worth, remains the main concern at Kant. For the philosopher, religion does not generate morals, but morals lead to religion, and good to faith, without a mixture of divinity. Debt understood as a practical constraint, an objective necessity deriving from the moral law and the obligation to respect it, is the supreme principle of morality and virtue, counter to any instinctual and natural drift, opposed to self-love and personal happiness. Supreme good is the purpose of the practical action, the ultimate goal to which we tend, established by moral law, and therefore it is possible by freedom and must be realized in the world by freedom.

I. Kant calls the transcendental synthesis of the diverse in imagination, without distinguishing the intuitions of each other. The unity of the

perception about the synthesis of imagination is the philosopher's intellect, and the synthesis of imagination is the pure intellect. In intellect there is pure knowledge, where transcendental use of reason is not at all objectively valid. Instead, the analytics of principles is a canon for judgment, and it teaches it to apply it to phenomena, to concepts of intellect, which contain rules a priori. The scheme is not always in itself but a product of imagination, since the synthesis of the latter is not intended in itself a particular intuitive, but only the unity in determining sensitivity.

I. Kant considers it the basis of the concepts our sensitive senses are not in images of objects but in schemes and therefore there is no image of a triangle that can ever be appropriate to the concept of a triangle. The schema of a pure concept of the intellect is something that can not be reduced to any image, but it is pure synthesis according to a rule of the unit according to concepts. The pure image of all sizes for the external sense is spatial, and all the objects of the senses, in general, are the time. For Kant, the pure schema of quantity is the number.

The number is the unity of the synthesis of the diverse of a homogeneous intuition, in that we produce the time in understanding intuition. Reality is the pure concept of intellect, a concept that in itself indicates an existing one. Time says Kant is nothing but the form of intuition, hence objects as phenomena, is the transcendental material of objects as things in themselves.

In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant states that each sensation has a degree or a certain amount that it can fill more or less at the same time. Scheme substance is permanently in real time, and in time is fixed and only skilful, and it can be determined in succession, and the simultaneity of events according to time. The schematic of the cause is the real one and it is the succession of the different, but the community scheme is the simultaneity of the determinations.

The scheme of possibility is the agreement of the synthesis of different representations with the conditions of time in general, the scheme of reality exists in a determined time, and that of necessity represents an existing object in time at any time.

All these have determined the scheme of each category, namely:

1. the quantity
2. producing time in the successive understanding of an object
3. the quality scheme
4. the relationship of the relationship
5. the way and
6. the category

Schemes are nothing but a priori determinations of time after certain rules, and these determinations are reported by the order of the categories in the time series to the content. Hence, the schematism of the intellect achieved in the transcendental synthesis of imagination tends to unite it to every variety of intuition. I. Kant states that the subject of a simple transcendental idea is produced by reason according to its laws. The transcendental reality of pure concepts of reason is based on the fact that we are led by such ideas through a necessary reasoning. For the Kant philosopher there are only three types of dialectical reasoning, namely:

1. The first class definition is the transcendental concept of the subject, which does not contain anything different to the absolute unity of this subject, and is called this dialectical reasoning transcendental paralogism
2. The second class of sophisticated reasoning is based on the transcendental concept of absolute totality-the state of reason in these reasoning is called the antinomy of pure reason
3. The third species of sophisticated reasoning represents the entirety of the conditions for thinking of objects in general that

can be given to me, starting from things they do not know by their simple transcendental concept, which Kant calls the ideal dialectic reasoning of pure reason .

Judging everything that exists is totally determined, it means to Kant that out of all the possible predicates, one is fit, and the complete restraint is a concept that we represent in concrete and is based on an idea that has its seat only in reason.

For I. Kant any concept is undetermined and it is based on the deterministic principle , meaning that from two opposite contradictory predicates only one can be attributed to it. The logical negation does not regard a concept, but only the relation between two concepts in a judgment. A transcendental negation means and nonexistent itself is opposed to the transcendental assertion.

The logical determination of a concept on reason is based on a disjunctive syllogism, in which the major premise contains a logical division, and the minor premises limit this sphere and the conclusion determines the concept. Therefore, reason is based on the principle of universality, the systematic division of all transcendental ideas.

Supreme reality is based on the possibility of all things as a principle and not as a whole, and the diversity of things is based on the limitation of being originally, but on its complete deployment.

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## The abortion — An Ethical Approach

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**ABSTRACT:** The abortion topic is very often discussed and each time we have to face the same problem: we don't get universal answers. All of our answers depend on many factors and mostly of the native cultural heritage. We cannot live outside the native culture; it is impregnated in our genes. So, after all, the miscarriage would be only a very personal option. That's why, the ethics is not necessarily a scientific field, it is rather a battlefield of arguments. **KEY WORDS:** ethics, theories, morality, abortion, fetus, person, rights, the golden rule, the potentiality principle

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The contemporary ethics is especially concerned with the individual problems, the personal options of the people. Nowadays, the concepts like *ethics* or *moral values* don't have a universal availability any more. They are subjects of philosophical reflection rather than ethical references.

The contemporary ethics is named "applied ethics" which means that the general principles are no longer available in any particular situation or in any kind of circumstances. The general idea of applied

ethics is that there is nothing good or bad in a thing in an absolute way. Each situation can be qualified as being a good or a bad one. The values are diverse, heterogeneous and even measurable. The ethicists don't fight against ethical theories; they just increase the idea that the ethical principles are very difficult or even impossible to be applied to some particular situations. In this category of situations we could also include abortion.

The morality of the abortion is continuously discussed and there are a lot of debates around it. First of all, it's important to mention that the abortion is a legal practice which means that the women who miscarry cannot be considered criminals. But even so, the morality of such an act is questionable. Is it enough to categorize such practices as legal or illegal? And even so, is any legal act also a moral one?

This kind of questions circumscribes the base of the moral debates. We are not robots and we are different, which means that we have different ways of seeing things, we have emotions and feelings. We care about what happens to us and to those of our kind. We love and we suffer, we hope and we are grateful, we are happy or disappointed, we get angry or we are glad, we cry and we laugh. And all of this because we care and caring is our highest quality. We, humans, are the only species in the Universe that have a moral dimension, the power to distinguish between good and bad. In his work *Pensées (Thoughts)*, Blaise Pascal considers that the human being is the only one in the Universe capable of thinking and feeling. This consciousness makes the people aware for the imminence of their own death and this is what makes them glorious and superior to the other animals.

Judith Jarvis Thomson, teacher at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and an important contributor to the ethical theory of abortion and metaphysics, in an article about the morality of abortion wants to prove that not necessarily the idea that the fetus is a human

being implies the morality or the immorality of a miscarriage, but other things should be taken into account when a woman decides to make an interruption of pregnancy. To accept the idea that the fetus is a person from the very beginning is the biggest confusion that interferes in this topic. The idea that the fetus is a person from the moment it has been conceived is named "*the argument of the slippery slope*" (Thomson 1974). According to this theory, the human being is developing from the first moment till the childhood but we cannot know for sure the moment or the age when a human being ended the process of being a person. The idea is that the fetus is not a person from the very first moment of its conception; it is only a biological woven that will become a person on his/her birth.

Even so, if we consider that the fetus is a human being from the moment of its conception this means that in this case it has the same right of living like any other human being, like its mother, for instance. This means that it is just as bad to take the fetus' or the mother's life. But, on the other hand, the mother has her own right to her body, she has to have the possibility to choose what is happening to her body. To better illustrate, J.J. Thomson is taking the following example for which he is well known all over the world: Let's imagine the situation of a famous violinist whose kidneys are failing day by day. To keep him alive, some doctors kidnapped you and connected him to your healthy kidneys. You weren't asked if you wanted to do that but if you decided to disconnect him, he would die. What would you do? If you decide to stay connected with the violinist you are a good person because you keep him alive and this is a nice gesture. Instead, if you disconnect from him you take his life and by this you commit a crime because to take someone's life is illegal. It is the same situation with the mother and the fetus.

Let's assume that the fetus is the result of a rape. In this case, does the mother have the right to decide the abortion? Or, is it ok that someone's life is conditioned by anyone else's decisions? The quoted

author is bringing some arguments that are meant to prove the fact that in some situations the abortion is absolutely necessary.

First of all, we can consider “the extreme position” (this is the author’s formula) when we have to save the mother’s life. In this case, if the mother and the fetus have equal rights to live, than who should die? The fetus is innocent, the mother is innocent too, the fetus doesn’t have the intention to shortcut the mother’s life and neither would the mother like to kill her own child for saving herself. What has to be done? In this situation, says the same author, to the living right of the mother, we will attach also her right to do what she likes with her body. So, if she and only she (without an external involvement) decides that she wants to live even if this means to miscarry, she should be free to do that. The mother has to protect her life with any price.

Besides that, the body is the “propriety” of the mother, it hasn’t been rented to her and to her son, and it belongs only to her. That’s why she is the only one who can choose what to do with it. Neither the doctor, nor the unborn child can decide instated of the mother. For example, Smith has a coat and John takes that coat from Smith and uses it for himself because he is freezing. It’s a normal situation to accept Johns’ position if we consider that Smith doesn’t need the coat. But, if Smith is also freezing, than it would be normal for Smith to take back his coat without wondering if he is doing good or bad by not giving his own coat to John. We cannot say, I’m sorry, I know it is your coat and you are about to freeze, but you have to understand that John is also freezing and you have to be good with him. It is the same situation with the mother and the fetus.

Then, what does *the right of living* mean? Is it the right to use someone else’s body for saving your own life? In some situations, the right of living doesn’t mean to save your life with any price and neither to allow someone else to use your own life to save him/her

self. The right of living means not to kill someone in an unfair way. Of course, this doesn't mean that there are less such situations when the fetus is killed unfairly or when he/she can use his/her mothers' body. But, of course, all of these depend of each situation.

Going further, even if a pregnancy is not the result of a rape but a consequence of a volunteer act, the mother still has the right to decide if she wants the baby or not. She has only a part of the responsibility for the fetus's presence in her body, not for all of it. For example, you open the window and a thief sees this, enters inside the house and steals things. It would be absurd to say that it's your fault because you made a sort of "invitation to steal" by opening the window. You have a part of the responsibility for that, you should take care of the house, but this doesn't mean that it's only your fault. It's the same with the fetus and only the mother can decide who would live inside her body.

More than that, we have to mention that the moral compulsoriness shouldn't be associated with the just or unjust acts. Very often we are tempted to say about a person's behavior that it is not just, instead of immoral or impolite. If we found out that we wouldn't have to stay connected to the violinist all our life, but only a few hours, it would be nice of us to help him. Even so, if we refused, we wouldn't be unjust with him; we would maybe be impolite or less moral. Also, it's absurd to consider that it is a nice gesture to help someone when it's easy to do that. It's a wrong argument to sustain that if it is easy to do something for someone, it would be unfair not to do that. Maybe, this is impolite, but in any case, not unfair.

Another argument of J.J. Thomsons' is that there is a very big difference between being the Samaritan and the Good Samaritan. The Good Samaritan lets down his responsibilities; he leaves his way to help the others. He isn't compelled to do that but he wants to. We have to appreciate his gesture. On the other hand, we

cannot hold responsible those people who pass by without caring for the poor men who have been robbed by the thieves. They aren't compelled to do that, it isn't their duty. If we maintain the analogy with the mother, we can say that a third person can only execute the mother's decision or desire, not to interfere in any way; this is a personal option.

Besides that, an argument like this "the mother is responsible of her children's life" cannot be sustained. She is responsible of her fetus' life if she decides that. Of course, if she decides to give birth, than she is responsible to feed him/her well, to be healthy and so on, but in this stage of evolution, she can refuse that.

The conclusion is that we cannot bring strong arguments for the abortion or against it; we can only say that everything depends on the situation. There are situations when we have to think about the mother's life but there are also a lot of situations when we have to consider the fetus' life above anything. Sometimes it's acceptable to miscarry, other times it is absolutely necessary but every time we have to take into account the mother's will because, in the end, the mother is the only person who has to keep and sustain the fetus inside her body.

The American teacher wants to underline the idea that a unidirectional thinking is not a healthy one. We have to overcome the prejudices of the time and of the religion and to go further with an open mind ready to accept the idea that some situations impel particular decisions. In our century it's not possible to be that rigid any more. We have to go on with the times we are living.

Richard Mervyn Hare thinks that the moral philosophy needs a theoretical base to be scientific, otherwise it is nothing but the result of human intuition which is nothing else but "the result of the education we've got" (Miroiu 1995, 52). That's why, in his opinion, the moral philosophy has so many difficulties. For example, most

of the ethicists who want to prove that the abortion is an immoral act because it involves killing a *person* make a big mistake: they use the concept of person in a wrong way. It is not even important to start our demonstration with the argument that the fetus is a person and no person should be killed; these are more than obvious. The mistake appears when we use the term of person in this context. The fetus can become a person if nothing changes till it is born. Otherwise, it is only a fetus or a biological woven.

From the very beginning the author is showing his intention when he sustains that he will bring some counter arguments against the teacher J.J.Thomson's opinion about abortion. The first one is the fact that "the woman has the right to do what she likes with her body" (Miroiu 1995) and the second is that the fetus is a person.

First of all, any person or human being has a lot of *rights* but most of them are contradictory which means that we cannot satisfy all of them in the same time. Besides that, in many situations, we cannot sustain that we have a right and we miss another because everything depends on the situation. In this case, it is not right to say that the mother has "the right" to do something with her body, but it is rather appropriate to use the terms of good or wrong.

On the other hand, to sustain that the fetus is a person and after that to incriminate the act of abortion is the simplest way of proving that the abortion is an immoral practice. But, we have to go further than that and to ask what would happen if the miscarriage wouldn't be performed? What would happen to the future person? We can see the difference of usage of the person concept here. Even if it is present here, it doesn't make any problems. Here we talk about the *potentiality principle* of Michael Tooley' (an American philosopher who had a few important contributions to the abortion topic). According to this principle, any living creature could live as a human being if it had the specific conditions. He gives the example with

the cat. If to a pregnant cat one would inject a miraculous medicine that would be able to transform its embryo into a human one, it would be able to develop like a human being. In conclusion, it would accomplish all the conditions that make it a “potential” human if nothing else changes (the used expression is *ceteris paribus*). Tooley considers that in this case, the abortion is not less immoral to the cats than to the humans.

Hare is talking also about the *golden rule* from the Christianity which says that you shouldn't do to someone else something that you don't like. The author is changing the tenses: “we should do to the others what we enjoyed when it was done to us” (Miroiu 1995, 52). According to this rule, if we are happy that we were born, we should also accept that any possible human being would be that happy. Abortion is not an immoral act because by it the right of living, the fundamental right of a human being, is not taken, even if the fetus is refused a life that it could have.

The moral problems become complicated when we base them on the common opinions. In this case, if we take into account the idea that the abortion is affecting also the fetus and the parents, we can say that the contraception doesn't affect anyone. So it would be wrong to sustain the idea that the contraception is also immoral like the abortion. The quoted author says that there are two levels of analyzing the moral problems: the first level concerns the learnt moral principles and the way we apply them while the second one is the criticism or the changes that we make on the first level. In the abortion topic, we should be more interested of the second level of the moral thinking. The principles of the first level cannot be applied to any kind of situation so the results can be regrettable. In this case we will have to face a bigger problem called the *weaknesses chain*.

For example, if we consider that to interdict the abortion is almost the same with the interdiction of contraception we will get to the



opposite side: if the contraception is permitted, then so should abortion be. If we allow the abortion, we should allow the infanticide. And if we allow the infanticide, we have to allow the homicide. This is an example of situation when the general principles are not different according to each situation. More than that, not all situations are the same like not all circumstances are similar.

Even if R.M.Hare is talking about the potential persons, those persons are identifiable in everyday life. In his opinion any human being should be let to enjoy the beauty of the life: "All I can do here is to throw a shadow of doubt over an apparently not problematic supposition: the supposition that someone cannot harm somebody by not letting him/her to be born. It's true that since he/she doesn't exist, he/she cannot be harmed; and neither is his/her life taken like he/she would have had one, although he/she is being refused to live. But, if it had been better for him/her to exist (because otherwise he/she wouldn't have been able to enjoy the privileges of the life), than indeed a bad thing was done to him/her by refusing his/her existence, and thus the possibility of this privilege. He/she wasn't hurt, but there are a lot of joys that he/she could have had but he/she didn't have." (Miroiu 1995, 64)

Even if we refer to professor J. J.Thomson or to R.M.Hare, the abortion topic is continuously disputed and for each situation we can find arguments to sustain or to argue an opinion. Every time we notice that the situations are not similar and the circumstances aren't either. That is why the ethical field has specific ways of approach; some of them represent the science while others are only our particular intuitions.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> R.M. Hare is an important contributor to the field of applied ethics, politics of philosophy and meta-ethics. He was a Philosophy teacher at Oxford University for many years. Important names in the applied ethics like Peter Singer or Bernard Williams were his students.

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# The Values of Morality from the Scientific Perspective

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**ABSTRACT:** The paper represents an attempt to establish the field of *morality* and *science* from a linguistic perspective, having as a sole criterion for the selection of the terms - etymology. We intend to observe some theoretical aspects, determine how morality works as a means of persuasion in certain contexts, and what are the lexical criteria. We will follow the lexeme *science* from the point of view of the relationship as meaning, with the lexeme *morality*.  
**KEY WORDS:** moral, morality, science, knowledge, lexical, sense

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## Preliminaries

The lexical field that we intend to study is related to the significance of *morality* and *science* lexmas, but as Trier (1931, 2) states, we will try that in our research „to bring in a knowledge of the extra-linguistic sphere, the aim being not the history of language as a mirror of spirit history, but only the history of the spirit (mirrored) in the history of the language.”

We will start from the systemic approach to Trier's vocabulary, who considers that the lexical elements can not be treated in isolation, because each term draws its semantic outline by constantly reporting to the other members of the field (paradigmatic perspective). The value of a word is recognized only when we delimit it from the value of its neighboring words which oppose them" (Trier 1931, 3). This theory of „distributive fields" was supplemented by other linguists from the point of view of syntagmatic relations - Walter Porzig<sup>1</sup>, John Lyons<sup>2</sup> and Eugenio Coşeriu<sup>3</sup>. Even if at first glance the two notions are not part of the same semantic sphere, we will consider changes in meaning due to linguistic contact with the French and Greek models.

The concept of *morality* is a research theme for psychologists, pedagogues, psychologists, philosophers, aestheticians, sociologists, axiologists, anthropologists, economists, linguists and psycholinguists. Compared with the society of past centuries, contemporary society has undergone fundamental changes in principles, values, and perceptions, which it knows (or not) and acquired over the passing of time. A factor that has caused this change in inter-human relations is the moral factor.

Science can not be neutral from the point of view of the values promoted, since it has a normative character and promotes moral values since the seventeenth century, even Descartes being the one proclaiming the dichotomy „values-facts". But science has a great disadvantage: it can not explain the meaning of life or the purpose of man on Earth. Science helps us to understand morality, but it can not give us moral advice, nor can it clarify the distinction between good and evil.

## **1. The concept of science**

Starting from the synonyms of the word *Ştiinţă* (*Science*) 1. s discipline. (Cybernetics is a recent ~ ) 2. teaching, (rare Latinism)

sapience, (inv) teachership. (~ about growing bees.) 3. science about science = science, scientology; the science of exegesis v. hermeneutics; political science = politology; the science of the future = futurology, prospective, futureology. 4. erudition, (fam., often ir.) savantlâc. (He is amazed by his ~ ) 5. v. skill. 6. v. craftsmanship, we will stop at three meanings that will connect with the theme we approach:

1. „knowledge acquired directly; experience”
2. „knowledge of Good and Evil (moral)”
3. „ensamble of knowledge gained through study; intellectual training, instruction;

Referring to the Biblical text, the term *συνείδησις*<sup>4</sup> „consciousness, the ability to discern between good and evil” (derived from the Latin *conscientia* „together science”) is a linguistic calculation of Gr. *είδησις*, formed with the prefixoid Gr. *συν* which expresses the idea of community in an action or association („self-leveling”), signifying Christian moral values, emphasized by the autonomy of individual judgment and the binding nature of ethical prescriptions, but in the text printed in 1688, the modeled phrase of the term „science” has been reduced. From the same word, the word *cunostinta* (knowledge) was preferred in translations<sup>5</sup> (formed by derivation from verb *a cunoaste* (to know) + suffix *-inta*) with the meaning „the action of knowing; the fact of having knowledge” (Munteanu 2008, 318, 367).

So the term *science* has begun to be used in the old language as a sign of significance as an alternative to *knowledge*, *conscience* and *consciousness*.

According to linguist Eugen Munteanu, Dosoftei tried to replace Gr. *συν* with prep. rom. *cu* (with), with the meaning of „sly cunning”, Radu Greceanu (Mart. Ort. 1691)<sup>6</sup> transposes Gr. *συνείδησις* through the phrase „knowledge of the soul”, and Dimitrie Cantemir uses the phrase „the good science of the hidden heart” (Munteanu 2008, 367).

In the current language the meaning of „my knowledge as a knowledgeable subject isolated about me as me knowing” and „my knowledge of me in the face of the superior forum” has been semantically transferred to the noun *con-stiinta* (consciousness) (formed from the Latin *scientia* (science) + Lat. prefix *con-*) (Stăniloae, 1987, 71).

Starting with the first half of the nineteenth century *prestiinta* (foreknowledge) lexical calculus was used, formed from the Latin *scientia* (science) + Lat. *pro / prae*.

According to the definition in the *Explanatory Dictionary of Romanian Language*<sup>7</sup>, we note that the term *science* is used in these meanings in certain phrases / expressions: *knowingly, to science*.

As we have seen from the occurrences of the word *science*, it has meanings that bring us closer to the lexeme *morality*, semantic-lexical structures that originate from Biblical text.

## 2. The concept of *morality*

The word *morality* comes from the Latin *moralitas, -atis*, Fr. *moralité*. „It has the meaning of *teaching, moral, parable*.

The lexeme is formed from the adjective „moral”, by suffixing with the suffix „-ity” into „morality”, widening the semantic sphere of the word and imposing it as a noun that designates „a person’s appropriation, quality, ability or aptitude to be moral”.

We will include in the lexical field the members of the derived classes of the lexeme components, because the term derived by prefixing / suffixing may involve a change in the lexical meaning.

Interesting is the derivation with negative prefixes, with which the antonymy is formed in Romanian, the category of antonyms formed with the prefixes *a-* and *i-* being rich: *moral – imoral - amoral*, both

forms are correct **amoral** și **immoral** (according to the model of the French words *immoral* and *amoral*), but with different meanings (some speakers mistakenly consider them to be synonymous). **Immoral** (< Fr. *immoral*) in the sense that it is contrary to morality, which violates its principles, which has no moral principle, knows the rules of morality, but practices actions that are rejected by the majority of society (DEX), and **amoral** (Fr. *amoral*) has the meaning: *which does not have the notion of morality, regardless of morality.*

The adjective **imorál** (immoral) enters into a relation of partial synonymy with adj. *unethical, unmoral, corrupt, depraved, harassed, disillusioned, degraded, broken and even obscene.* The two notions are related to morality.

The adjective *immoral* can be attributed to:

- to a person, so an immoral person is a shameless person, without a character and living without rules.
- generic notions: *immoral act*
- contrary to morality: *immoral book.*

As for the terms **amoralism**, „a concept that requires an attitude of indifference to morality,” and **immoralism**, „a theory that contests the value of moral norms and judgments in a given age, denying morality,” are words derived from *amoral* and *immoral*.

In the Romanian language, the productive prefix is **the negative prefix ne-**, which forms nouns, adjectives, adverbs: *nemoral* (not moral). The neologist prefix **in-** (**im-** before the bilabials and **i-** before the sonants [l, m, n, r]) doubles **ne-** for the words corresponding to the savant Romanian language variant: *immoral, immorality*. Other prefixes of cult origin (not inherited) from ancient Latin or Greek, that are present in Romanian, especially through latin-romanic loans (analytical or calculations), specific to the lexical field of morality are: **pre-** (‘before’, *pre-moral*). Some affixes have an uncertain status, between prefixes and prefixoides (constituent elements) of Greek

origin are: *anti-* („against”, versus, *antimoral*), *hyper-* („over-measure, in a very high degree, super”; *hypermoral*). The words *pseudomoral* (*pseudo-* „false, apparently similar, supposedly”) and *quasi-moral* (*quasi-* „half, somewhat, almost”) are formed by composition, because *quasi* and *pseudo* are prefixoids.

According to the *Orthographic, Orthoepic and Morphological Dictionary of Romanian Language*, 2nd edition revised and added, 2005, the lexeme *morál* accepts three forms of plural: adj. m. - moral, pl. moráli; adj. f. - morálă, pl. morále; s. n. - moral, pl. moráluri.

In literature, especially in children’s literature, morality is reduced to a conclusion from the history of the story, the purpose of which is to transmit the moral values (good and bad etc.) that can be applied in social relations, here the term *moral* has the plural form of *morale* (morals). As a literary species of the epic genre, the fable has a specific structure: the narrative part and the moral - resembles some sayings (moral is delimited from the first part by a blank or can be deduced from the action). The addition with which this species intervenes in literature is the way to highlight the human defects that must be addressed by personification (the characters are animals, plants or objects in human situations), but also the funny character of the events, because laughter can have an educational character.

In philosophy, morality has a broader meaning than ethics, and defines „the sciences of the spirit,” which contemplates all manifestations that are not expressly physical in the human being. Hegel differentiated between *objective morality*, which refers to obedience to moral laws (set by standards, laws and traditions of society); and *subjective morality*, which addresses the fulfillment of a duty by its own act.

In the philosophical context, *ethical* and *moral* have different meanings the Terms have a different etymological origin. The word „ethics” comes from Greek *etos* which means „way of being” or



„character”. Already the word „moral” originates in the Latin term „*morales*”, which means „in relation to habits”.

A problem that we will not deal with in our study is: How do we become moral? Are we born moral or become on the way (progressive-chronological morality or momentary *kairos*)?

Morality is to put your act of choice and feelings in order (eg common - the fear of things and unnatural - the fear of water). Here reference can be made to morality as compared to psychoanalysis. Morality does not mean to respect certain rules, choices can turn man into a good being (understands more clearly what is evil) or bad (you can understand or not).

A taxonomy of morality seems almost impossible, we do not know the moment when a person becomes moral, there are aspects of overlapping in terms of morality, starting from the definition. It can be a process of society, this is a delicate problem.

### **3. The valence of lexems *science* vs *morality***

Combining the two words *morality* and *science* could form the phrase *morality of science*, but at the same time, the phrase *science of morality*. In this situation, can the genitive go in both directions at once? In what way can or should science have a moral dimension? Should science not be approached in a cognitive sense, as a way of understanding and not necessarily being used (or not) in the ethical direction?

We did not intend to demonstrate that there is a necessary ethical moment in the act of science, because we may go out of the study area (which may be vague and even speculative) but we will observe that the *morality of science* can be oriented in two directions. The first direction is determined by the presence of the imperative „must ...”, which means that we are limited by rules (deviation is freedom,

which can be an amoral act), and the second direction is given by a particular and individual in the sphere of social and institutional which imposes, unwilling/unworthy, rules and responsibilities (here they refer to what they want to convey). It's not enough that you know what to do, but you have to also act.

From this perspective, the Romanian speakers introduced French loans referring to the act of morality:

nouns - *immorality, amorality, moralist, immoralism;*

adjectives - *moral, antimoral, overmoral, premoral, pseudomoral, quasi-moral, immoralistic, moralizant (moralizing), moralizator(moralizing);*

adverbială – *moral, premoral, quasi-moral.*

Verbs – *to moralize*

Despite the apparent disjunction between the two terms, they intersect as meaning in contact with the Greek language, so that we can assert that science, in its incipient phases, was based on moral principles. We believe that in any field of activity it is necessary to have some moral principles, here referring especially to the horizontal relation (man-society), which can be a result of the vertical relation (man-God report). You can not have a good relationship with God, and horizontally, relationships not to rely on moral principles.

Socrates mentions that self-knowledge (Rotaru 2005, 124) is the basis of morality. History presents human society as a hierarchical structure, the deviations from this structure being harshly punished. The intervention of morality has created a bridge between the mobile society and those punished. Thus, the moral factor meant the creation of equality relations and favored the relationship and the interaction between the people.

Unfortunately, the material factor puts pressure on society, which leads to alienation to yourself, to principles and values.

## Conclusions

As far as the lexeme *science* is concerned, we compared the Romanian lexeme to the Greek one in order to create a clear picture of what we wanted to highlight during this study.

It started from the definition of the meanings from a descriptive semasiological perspective, then we tried to process the material from the onomasiological perspective, emphasizing the relation between the Romanian and the French lexemes, regarding the lexeme *morality* and the Greek one with reference to the notion of *science*.

In addition to old words and phrases with a moral sense, the lexicon of morality knows a variety of enrichment and diversification, the modalities of lexico-semantic renewal being diverse: calchieri<sup>8</sup>, paraphrasing, translation or borrowing of foreign affective terms: *immoral*, *immoralism*, *immorality*, *amoral*, *amoralism*, *amoralst*, *amoralize*, *moralist*, *moralizing*, *moralization*.

The development of this terminology is based on old lexical elements, so the basic generic noun, *moral* (< Lat. *sentire*) generates a rich lexico-etymological family by derivation, calc and lexical loan, the dynamics being from a primary, concrete sense, toward many abstract ways. (see DEX, DLR).

The results of the present research thus confirm the basic premises of the analysis: interdependence between the scientific context, morality and language (lexic); the diachronic and diatopic variation of conceptualization and affective lexicalisation.

## Endnotes

1. Vezi Porzig, Walter, *Das Wunder der Sprache*, Berna, 1950: uses the term "inclusive semantic field" which means that structure within the vocabulary determined by the semantic relations between units which objective designations are related, in other words linguistic units that refer.
2. Lyons, John, *Structural Semantics. An Analysis of a Part of the Vocabulary of Plato*, Oxford, 1969, p. 59: considers that "the significance of a given language

- unit is defined as the set of (paradigmatic) relationships that the unit contacts with other units of the language (in its context or contexts in which it occurs):
3. Coșeriu, Eugenio, *Teoria limbajului și lingvistică generală*. 5 studii, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 2004, p. 305: "The lexical field is defined as a lexical paradigm that derives from the segmentation of a lexical continuum of content in various units which in the language are in the form of words and which are available in immediate oppositions on the basis of simple distinctive features".
  4. Cf. Munteanu, Eugen, *Lexicologie biblică românească*, Editura Humanitas, Iași, 2008, p. 364: „Most lexicograph researchers, as well as theologians, converge to the conclusion that Gr. *συνείδησις* is a lexical creation of stoic philosophers who, since Chrysippos (dead in 208 BC), have been using this term to name in particular psychological consciousness (cf. Diogenes Laertius, VII, 85) and then the moral consciousness, perceived as the source of remorse for the one who did wrong.”
  5. There is instability in translation, because the lexical norms were missing, hence the differences in meaning of Gr. *Συνείδησις*.
  6. Mărt. Ort. 1691 = *Pravoslavnica Mărturisire a săborniceștii și apostoleștii Bisericii, după grecească (...) întoarsă în limba rumânească de Radul Logofăt Greceanul (...)*, Buzău, 1691. Ediție de Niculae M. Popescu și Gheorghe I. Moisescu, București, 1942.
  7. See DEX 98 s.n. *Știință*, sciences, s.f. I.1. Being aware of (something) of being informed; knowledge. \* Loc. adv. with (or without) science = (not) knowing; (un)conscious; with (or without) permission. Consciously = knowingly, fully aware of the facts. With (or without) one's knowing = with (or without) the consent or approval of someone. To know = for it to be known. \*\* News, hearing. 2. Conscience. II.1. Intellectual training, instruction; education, erudition. \* Book science = knowledge of writing and reading. 2. A systematic set of knowledge about nature, society and thinking; an assembly of knowledge from a certain area of knowledge. \* Scientist = scholar, taught. [Pr: know-in] - Ști + suf. -ință (with some meanings after Fr. science).
  8. *Ibidem* s.n.: the notion of **morality** is defined as "The appropriation of what is moral (I 1); the nature, the character, the value of a fact, the conduct of a person or a community from a moral point of view. \*\* Behavior, conduct, manners in accordance with moral principles; honesty, good behavior."
  9. The meaning of "morally good, according to moral rules" is recorded for the first time at the end of the 14th century, the **moral** word coming from the Lat. **moralis**, which, in turn, derives from the Latin word, **mos, moris** "habit." The word **morālis** has been applied to the **concrete rules governing the actions and behaviors of people**. These norms, in general, came from the use and customs of society, that is, from tradition.
  10. Porzig, *Idem*, 1950, p. 74: „Derivative families and semantic fields are segmentations of one and the same vocabulary. Thus a word belongs as a rule to a derivative family as well as to a semantic field. Thus, a semantic field can also be composed, as a whole or in part, of words that are members of a derivative family.”
  11. "a" is a compositional element that indicates absence, exclusion, etc. [ Var . : an - ]

12. Cf. Iordan, I., Robu, Vl., *Limba română contemporană*. București, 1973, p. 114: **Prefixoidele** (*false prefixes or pseudoprefixes*) have in common with the prefixes only the position of affixation, but they are words with their own meaning in their home language (most of them are from ancient Greek). The most common prefixoids in Romanian are: **aero-** („regarding air”, *aeropurtat*), **auto-** („self, own”, *autobiografie*), **bio-** („regarding life”, *bioenergetic*), **geo-** („regarding earth”, *geopolitic*), **hemo-** („regarding blood”, *hemostatic*), **hipo-** („regarding the horse”, *hipofag*), **iso-/izo-** („equal, same”, *izomorfism*), **orto-** („correct”, *ortografic*), **filo-** („lover of”, *filogerman*), **micro-** („tiny, a million part”, *microradiografie*), **mono-** („unique, alone, once”, *monocelular*), **poli-** („many”, *polivitamină*), **proto-** („first, previous, prehistoric, primitive, simple, initial”, *protocronism*), **radio-** („regarding electromagnetic radiation”, *radiolocație*), **semi-** („half”, *semipreparat*), **tele-** („far, at distance, from far”, *telecomandă*), **tri-** („three, triple”, *tri*), **zoo-** („regarding animals, animal”, *zootehnician*) etc.
13. The father of the fable is Esop (a Greek slave), but its origins are found in the ancient Orient. Jean de Fontaine (French writer of the 12th century) was the one who imposed the modern fable. In Romanian literature the first fabulist was Alecu Donici, followed by Grigore Alexandrescu who is considered the greatest Romanian fabulist. Other Romanian writers who approached this genre are: Anton Pann, George Topîrceanu, Tudor Arghezi.
14. See *Dicționarul etimologic român*, 1958-1966: *morâl* (morâlă), adj. – Etic. Fr. *moral*. – Der. *morâlă*, s. f. (etică; dojană), din fr. *morale*; *moralicesc*, adj. (moral), inv., sec. XVIII; *moralicește*, adv. (moralmente); *moralitate*, s. f., din fr. *moralité*; *moraliza*, vb., din fr. *moraliser*; *moralizator*, adj., din fr. *moralisateur*; *moralmente*, adv., din fr. *moralement*; *moralist*, s. m., din fr. *moraliste*.
15. Also see *Marele dicționar de neologisme*, 2000: *Morâl*, -Ă I. adj. 1. according to moral principles. ◇ from which a teaching takes place, didactic. 2. In terms of psychic, spirit or intellect, intellectual, spiritual. II. 1. the ensemble of mental, spiritual faculties. 2. mood. ◇ courage. (< lat. *moralis*, fr. *moral*)
16. Cf. *Dictionary.com Unabridged* © Random House, Inc. 2018: *Morality* refers to generally accepted behavioral habits and the right to live in a society and the individual's practice in relation to them: the morality of our civilization. Ethics now involves high standards of honorable and honest negotiation, as well as of methods used, especially in professions or business: the ethics of the medical profession.
17. See *Dicționarul de neologisme*, s.n. *ÉTOS* s.n. Ensemble of moral traits specific to man, social group or age; *morality* \*\* Cultural specific of a community. \*\* Character, moral, morality, ensemble of moral norms and customs; part of a speech in which morals are spoken of. [Writting and ethos. / <lat., gr. *ethos*].
18. *Morality in the public sphere can be modeled by religious values and principles*; see Sorin Bădrăgan, „The Concept of the Holiness of the Church as a Paradigm for a Society Governed by the Rule of Law”, *Jurnalul Libertatii de Conștiinta (Journal for Freedom of Conscience)*, Editions IARSIC, Les Arcs, France, vol. 5, 2017, pp.794-803.
19. *Vezi DEX* s.n. *Moralist*, -Ă, *moralști*, -ste, s.m. și f. 1. Philosopher, thinker, writer, etc. who is concerned with moral issues. 2. (Fam. peior.) A person

- who likes to give nagging advice, to always reprimand. From fr. moraliste.
20. Ibidem, *Moralizant*, -Ă, moralizanti, -te, adj. (Rar) Moralizator. From fr. moralisant.
  21. Ibidem. *Moralizator*, -Ooare, moralizatori, -oare, adj. Which contributes to the creation of a moral atmosphere, to the spreading of morals, which gives moral teachings, moralizing someone; educational. (As noun, peior.) Who preaches moral principles with ostentation. From fr. moralisateur.
  22. *Moraliza*, *moralizez*, vb. I. Tranz. 1. To give someone moral teachings. 2. (Fam.) Making someone moral; to reprimand, to rebuke. From fr. moraliser.
  23. Stanciu-Istrate, M., *Calcul lingvistic în limba română*, București, Editura Academiei, p. 57: „The calculations and translations, made especially by French words, had the advantage, in relation to loans, that they seemed Romanian, although in reality they were 'neologic imitations'.

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